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94 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
THE STANDING OF THIRD PARTIES TO COLLATERALLY
ATTACK FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREES
Introduction
The question of what effect a divorce decree rendered in one
state will have in any other state is in fact an aggregate of many
problems. A given decree might be binding on certain parties
and not binding on others; a decree might be vulnerable if ques-
tioned in one type of proceeding but not vulnerable in another
type. Many examples might be set forth to illustrate that the
foreign divorce decree produces a multitude of issues. We shall
consider but one aspect of the over-all problem here-the ability
of third parties, those not participating in the original proceed-
ing, to attack collaterally a divorce decree rendered in a foreign
state.' Without an attempt being made in this note to answer
the very difficult question of what constitutes jurisdiction, 2 it
may be stated that the basis of the impeachment of its decree
must be the lack of jurisdiction by the divorcing court, since
if the original divorcing court possessed sufficient jurisdiction,
the decree will be entitled to full faith and credit in every other
state under Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Consti-
tution.3 Conversely, if the court rendering the decree lacked
jurisdiction, the decree need not be given such recognition. As
the United States Supreme Court said in Williams v. North Caro-
lina II,4 "A judgment in one State is conclusive upon the merits
in every other State, but only if the court of the first State
had... jurisdiction to render the judgment.",;
1. A collateral attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack in that
the latter is an attempt to have a decree or judgment declared void in a pro-
ceeding instituted for that specific purpose, whereas the former is an
attempt to impeach the validity or binding effect of the decree as a side
issue or in a proceeding instituted for some other purpose primarily.
2. The requirements said to be necessary to give a court jurisdiction of
the marital res have not always been the same. Briefly, prior to 1942 the
requisite was that the divorcing state be the matrimonial domicile. Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906), whereas after 1942 it became sufficient to
give the court such jurisdiction if one of the spouses be domiciled within
the state and proper service be made upon the other. Williams v. State of
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
3. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
4. 325 U.S. 226 (1944). This case is frequently designated Williams v.
State of North Carolina II to distinguish it from the first Williams case
cited, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 229.
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Whether a court has jurisdiction is of course a question which
must be determined in a judicial proceeding, and it is obvious
that a court in granting a divorce makes such a determination.
This judicial finding may not be conclusive. A state court can-
not by its own decision confer jurisdiction upon itself, although
as to some parties the original finding of jurisdiction may be con-
clusive. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that
where the issue is raised for the second time between the original
parties and both of these parties appeared in the original pro-
ceedings, the finding of jurisdiction by the first court is as to
them res judicata; another state court cannot permit them to re-
litigate the issue.6 It is possible that one who was not a party to
the original proceeding might institute a judicial proceeding in a
second state questioning the jurisdiction of the divorce court.
This raises the question as to when a third party may collaterally
attack the jurisdiction of the divorce court. For aught that ap-
pears in the decided case law specifically passing upon attacks
by third parties, the holding of the Supreme Court in German
Savings and Loan Association v. Dormitzer7 remains the law
today. There the Court said, "It is too late now to deny the
right collaterally to impeach a decree of divorce made in another
state, by proof that the court had no jurisdiction, even where the
record purports to show jurisdiction and the appearance of the
other party.",, In view of the recent action of the Supreme Court
in forbidding some original parties to relitigate the jurisdictional
question, the Court might possibly today take a different atti-
tude in applying the full faith and credit clause to third party
attacks. Nevertheless, we shall disregard the question of a con-
stitutional mandate upon the state courts to prohibit such
assaults and investigate what policies the state courts themselves
have adopted with regard to permitting such attacks. Therefore,
our attention will be focused not on what is necessary to the
existence of juridiction as defined by either the Supreme Court
or the state courts, but rather on when and by whom the exis-
tence of that jurisdiction can be brought into question.
In considering when an attack upon jurisdiction will be per-
6. Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1947) ; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343(1947); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
7. 192 U.S. 125 (1904).
8. Id. at 128. See Williams v. State of North Carolina II, 325 U.S. 226
(1944).
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mitted, the particular status of the individual raising the juris-
dictional question is the vital factor. In dealing with this prob-
lem, it will be considered under two main heads: attack by a
subsequent spouse of one of the divorcees, and attack by some
other third party.
ATTACK BY SECOND SPOUSES
The Doctrine of Pari Delicto
The situation in which a second spouse seeks to bring the pre-
vious divorce into question is most frequently one in which he
seeks an annulment of the second marriage on the ground that
the first union was never dissolved. Where the issue is raised by
a second spouse, the court has squarely before it the disposition
of a marital status and realizes that its decision will directly af-
fect- the intimate family relations of at least several people.
Therefore a court is naturally loath to disturb these family ties
which may have existed for many years by telling supposedly
married people that they are not lawfully wedded and that their
supposedly legitimate children are illegitimate. This situation is
not simply the advancement of some property right in which the
effect of the decision upon intimate relations erected on the
strength of the foreign decree might not be so direct. Thus the
fact that the immediate and certain result of the court's action
in an annulment will always be as indicated, might well be one
reason why a considerable number of courts bar the attack of a
second spouse on the foreign divorce decree.
But there is an even more compelling reason why a second
spouse is often estopped, for in the bulk of the cases he has been
partly responsible for its procurement. This fact is not sur-
prising, since only one aware of the circumstances under which
a divorce was procured would be in a position to impeach its
validity. The fact that the second spouse has been instrumental
in the procurement of the decree supplies the basis upon which
a court may foreclose the attack if it chooses. The estoppel, if
applied, is most frequently based upon the equitable maxim of
pari delicto-where the wrong of one party equals that of the
other the defendant is in the stronger position. In the case of
assistance by the second spouse in procuring the divorce, the
parties would seem to be clearly in pari delicto. The spouse
actually procuring the decree was certainly in the wrong in com-
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mitting a fraud upon the foreign court, by falsely asserting his
domicile; and the person with whom he later married, having
aided and perhaps even financed the divorce, would appear to be
equally guilty. A number of courts have applied this doctrine
and thus prevented an attack by one who aided in the original
divorce, married the divorcee, and later seeks an annulment by
asserting the continued efficacy of the original marriage.9 The
California District Court of Appeals has stated the essence of
the doctrine in a very frank and enlightening manner, which
well illustrates its applicability. In Harlan v. Harlan it said :1o
Plaintiff herein was not technically a party to the Mexican
suit .... [But] He as much as any other, not excepting
the defendant, was responsible for the institution of the suit
and obtaining the decree. His interest was to procure the
result which he now seeks to nullify, after having lived with
the defendant as husband and wife for over twelve years.
That the sweet may have turned sour does not make it con-
scionable that the plaintiff should be allowed now to undo
what his own hand and mind had so much to do in creating.
Plaintiff therefore is not in a position to question the valid-
ity of the defendant's divorce. This is the principle of
quasi-estoppel which is based on the principle that one can-
not blow both hot and cold, or that one with full knowledge
of the facts should not be permitted to act in a manner
inconsistent with his former position to the injury of an-
other."'
Several courts have shown such enthusiastic adherence to the
rule that he who is par delicto shall not receive the aid of the
court, that they have refused to enter into the questioning of
even the notoriously void "Mexican mail order divorce."' 2
9. Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Mussey v. Mussey,
251 Ala. 439, 37 So.2d 921 (1948); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App.2d 657,
161 P.2d 490 (1945); Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.E. 391, 157 AtI.
675 (Ch. 1931); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N.Y. 81, 126 N.E. 508 (1920).
10. 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 661, 161 P.2d 490, 493 (1945).
11. Another reason for the application of an estoppel is the rule that
one who invokes the jurisdiction of a court will not later be heard to ques-
tion it. I BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAW 479 (1935). Although technically
this doctrine would apply only to the person who filed his bill for divorce,
it is not an objectionable extension of the rule to hold that one who has ac-
tively aided in the procurement of the decree was in fact a party to the suit
and hence cannot question his own invocation of jurisdiction. Several courts
have based their decision on this rule. Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22,
19 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 177 App. Div.
162, 163 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dept. 1917). Most of the courts applying an
estoppel have mentioned this invocation of jurisdiction rule, but have rested
their decisions principally on the pari delicto doctrine.
12. The New Jersey courts in particular have been very consistent in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/9
98 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
From the foregoing, it would appear that the question whether
an attack by a second spouse who was partly responsible for the
procurement of the divorce should ever be permitted would easily
be answered in the negative. However, there is a corollary to the
doctrine under discussion. The maxim is based upon the prin-
ciple that to give the plaintiff the relief he seeks would run
counter to public morals and defeat the good of society. Hence,
the complementary rule states that the doctrine of pari delicto
will not be applied to a situation in which its application would
do more harm to the public good than if the relief were granted.23
Some courts have taken the position that the case of attack by a
second spouse with "unclean hands" is one in which there will be
more harm done in not annulling the marriage.1 ' Thus the issue
becomes plain; the courts are not bound absolutely by a rule of
law to adhere to one position or the other, asserting they must
or must not permit attack. The question is squarely put to the
courts: Will the interests of society be better served by permit-
ting or prohibiting such an assault upon the validity of a foreign
divorce? It is not surprising that different courts and even the
same court at different times have answered the question incon-
sistently. There are considerations supporting either position.
In support of the decisions permitting collateral attack, it is
pointed out that to decline to do so is, in effect, to sanction the
defiance of the divorce laws of the domiciliary state. These laws,
specifying the occasions on which a divorce may be procured, are
one of the means by which the state performs its function of
protecting the public morals. Thus in order for the state to per-
form this function it is necessary that divorces be procured by its
citizens only in accordance with the divorce laws of their domi-
cile. Since the proper protection of the public morals is vital to
the general welfare, it is urged that the courts by adopting a
their refusal to hear one who is in pari delicto. Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J.
531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949) Weise v. Hughes, 1 N.J.S. 104, 62 A.2d 695 (Sup.
Ct. 1948). See Pandeliaes v. Pandelides, 182 Misc. 819, 47 N.Y.S.2d 247(Sup. Ct. 1944) (Mail order divorce from the island of Cyprus).
13. "Although the parties are shown to be in pan delicto the court will
grant relief to one of them if its forbearance will be productive of an
offense against public morals or good conscience." Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio
App. 203, 217, 50 N.E.2d 889, 896 (1943).
14. Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944);
Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill. App. 396, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937) ; Smith v. Smith,
72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943) ; Kiesenbeck v. Kiesenbeck, 145 Ore.
82, 26 P.2d 58 (1933).
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policy of estoppel would hinder the state in the performance of
a function essential to the welfare of its citizens. The argument
is sometimes summed up by the statement that the state is an
"interested party" and that the vindication of the public policy
as expressed in the divorce laws overrides any other consider-
ations.15
Those courts which believe that the interests of society are
better served by permitting a second spouse to attack a foreign
divorce decree collaterally, regardless of the fact that he has
"unclean hands," sometimes offer another reason for their
holding. They assert that a decree rendered without jurisdiction
is essentially a nullity anyway, and that it is better for all con-
cerned that the supposed marriage relation be ended as quickly
as possible. 16 Their theory is that such a decree will forever be
a nullity, and that the court's declaration of such fact does
nothing aside from acting as an estoppel to assert the future
validity of the second marriage. For this reason, it is stated to
be imperative that the invalidity be recognized in order to
prevent the vesting of the rights of innocent people on the re-
lation. This is urged despite the fact that almost invariably the
interests of innocent parties have arisen because, they say,
these would some day be lost anyway. As one court put it, "To
temporize or postpone will only delay the evil day and possibly
still further add to the unhappy complications into which they
[innocent parties] have been unwittingly led." 17 The fallacy
with this argument lies in the fact that, although the decree may
be "essentially invalid," it becomes invalid in legal contemplation
only when the facts rendering it such have been found in a
judicial proceeding to exist, and a court has pronounced that the
decree is a nullity. If no one is permitted or no one chooses to
question the validity of the the divorce or marriage, it is, for all
intents and purposes, valid. If the guilty are not permitted to
attack, and the innocent do not choose to do so because it would
15. "But the consideration that would ordinarily be shown one wronged
by the party against whom an estoppel is sought must yield to the public
interest in so important a matter as the marital status of the citizens of
this State." Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 380, 31 S.E.2d 818, 828(1944) ; Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ("Mex-
ican mail-order divorce") ; Kiesenbeck v. Kiesenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P.2d 58(1933); Hughey v. Ray, 207 S.C. 374, 36 S.E.2d 33 (1945).
16. Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Jardine v. Jar-
dine, 291 Ill. App. 396, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937).
17. Frey v. Frey, 59 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
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be against their better interest, when are the interests of the
innocent parties to be uprooted by a finding of nullity? It is,
therefore, submitted that the argument of those courts holding
that they are compelled to declare the invalidity begs the ques-
tion-that it is but a rationalization for the decision after it has
been reached upon other considerations. The "essential in-
validity" argument will not operate as a bar to the application
of an estoppel if other considerations dictate its propriety.
Consider the action of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Goodloe v. Hawk.18 After reviewing the rationale
of its own decisions in two previous cases in which the "essential
invalidity" of the decree was held to preclude the application of
an estoppel, the court stated:
We think it may now be said that the general public policy
in this jurisdiction as judicially interpreted no longer pre-
vents application in annulment actions of the laches and
estoppel doctrines in determining the effect to be given such
divorce decrees.19
Those courts which have found the application of an estoppel
to serve better the interests of society, would appear to advance
more persuasive reasons for their position. Frequently the in-
terests of innocent parties have already arisen (such as the
legitimacy of a child born to the second union) and it is clear
that those not innocent should not be allowed to disturb them.
As pointed out previously, in all likelihood the validity of the
second marriage will never again be challenged. It has been
said that the test should be one of whether the rights of innocent
persons will, in each particular case, be adversely affected.20
Their point of view might be summed up as, "Let what was
done be done." It is better that the guilty parties be allowed to
flout the laws of the domiciliary state than that the innocent
should suffer because of the undoing of the wrong.
But there is an equally compelling reason advanced in favor
of the estoppel. Those courts which have declined to apply an
estoppel have done so largely on the grounds that the public
morals would be harmed by their doing so. 21 Those courts ap-
plying the estoppel have felt it more to the advancement of public
18. 113 F.2d 753 (1940).
19. Id. at 757.
20. Sandberg v. Sandberg, 269 App. Div. 192, 54 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
21. See note 14 supra.
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morals that they do so. They point out that if the second spouse
enters the marital relation with the knowledge that he can at
any time escape from his obligations by pointing to the inva-
lidity of the previous divorce, he will be more likely to favor a
void decree. The reasoning is well summarized in Harlan v.
Harlan:
To hold otherwise protects neither the welfare nor the
morals of society but, on the contrary, such holding is a
flagrant invitation to others to circumvent the law, cohabit
in unlawful state and when tired of such situation apply to
the court for relief from the indicia of the marriage status. 22
The Degree of Guilt Required
We have seen that an essential to the doctrine of pari delicto is
wrongful conduct on the part of the second spouse. What degree
of guilt must there be? The necessary guilt might vary in degree
from originating the entire idea of divorce and financing the
undertaking (an occurrence not at all rare23 ) to a mere con-
tracting of the second marriage with knowledge of the circum-
stances under which the decree was obtained. The New York
courts have been rather reluctant to find sufficient guilt in knowl-
edge alone.24 The New Jersey courts, on the other hand, have
been quite astute to find that nothing more than knowledge of
the circumstances surrounding the decree, or even something
less, constitutes sufficient guilt to raise an estoppel.2 5 The atti-
tude of the New Jersey court, to the extent that actual knowledge
22. 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 663, 161 P.2d 490, 494 (1945).
23. See, for example: Frey v. Frey, 59 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 19 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Jardine v. Jardine, 291 Ill.
App. 396, 9 N.E.2d 645 (1937) ; Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N.J.E. 391, 157
Atl. 676 (Ch. 1931); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N.Y. 81, 126 N.E. 508
(1920); Oldham v. Oldham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dept.
1917).
24. Lefferts v. Lefferts, 263 N.Y. 131, 188 N.E. 279 (1933); Fischer v.
Fischer, 254 N.Y. 463, 173 N.E. 680 (1930). But see Heller v. Heller, 172
Misc. 875, 15 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (a more recent case stating that
where the second husband learned of the decree during the marriage but
continued to live with the divorcee he is estopped because, "He is not at
liberty to play fast and loose with the defendant.").
25. In Weise v. Hughes, 1 N.J.S. 104, 62, A.2d 695 (Supt. Ct. 1948) mere
knowledge was held sufficient. In Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d
436 (1949) an objective standard was established. The court said: "Inquiry
would have disclosed that the decree was void; and it is but fair to presume
that he refrained from inquiry because of the fear of unwelcome informa-
tion. Be this as it may, the duty of inquiry was his." Id. at 534, 64 A.2d
at 438.
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is sufficient, would appear to be the more sound. Certainly,
entering into the second marriage relation with knowledge that
the decree is invalid is the major wrongful act that a second
spouse can commit. It is this act which frequently leads to the
injury of innocent parties. Such conduct as encouraging and
aiding in the procurement of the divorce merely adds to what
alone should be a sufficiently wrongful act. If the courts conclude
that the interests of society would be better served by an estop-
pel, the precise degree of guilt should be a minor issue. The
problem of the precise degree of guilt necessary will not arise so
very often, for in the bulk of the annulment cases the party chal-
lenging the decree will have been involved in some manner prior
to its procurement, and the sufficiency of the guilt will not be
dwelled upon as a major issue.20 In the more infrequent cases,
involving no more than knowledge, another doctrine would be
applicable. If a court did not feel that the guilt of the second
spouse sufficiently approximated that of the divorcee to make
pc ri delicto applicable, but did feel that other considerations
dictated the attack should be foreclosed, the doctrine of laches
might be applied.
With regard to the case in which the second spouse knew
nothing of the invalidity of the divorce at the time of the second
marriage, the bases for estopping him set out above would
clearly not apply. The cases in which such has been the situation
have been comparatively rare, and the explanation is apparent.
Only one with knowledge of the facts surrounding the divorce
would be aware of its vulnerability. If the second spouse had
no such knowledge at the time of the second marriage, it is un-
likely that he would undertake a subsequent investigation. In
the few cases involving this situation, the estoppel has not been
applied.27
The dicta in several cases have raised an interesting possibility
as to the basis on which the attack by an innocent second spouse
26. See note 24 supra.
27. Davis v. Davis, 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 301 (1938); Ohlson v.
Ohlson, 54 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1945). But unreasonable delay in bring-
ing the action after discovery of the facts during the course of the second
marriage has been held to bar the plaintiff. Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875,
15 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Although this might conflict with the
New York rule that mere knowledge is not enough to put one in par delicto,
the decision could be upheld on the basis of laches.
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might be foreclosed.23 The reasoning advanced in these cases
was that a stranger to a decree or judgment should be allowed
to impeach it only when it adversely affects an interest of his
acquired prior to its rendition. A person subsequently marrying
a divorcee has no such prior interest affected by the decree. If
the major premise advanced by these dicta be correct, there is
a sound basis upon which attack by any second spouse should
be denied.21 The second spouse has probably not been hurt in
any way by the decree. It is to be presumed that it was to his ad-
vantage to have been able to secure the divorced spouse as his
husband or wife. Considering the question realistically, does the
husband bring his action for annulment out of a sudden horror
upon the discovery that he has married a woman whose previous
divorce was not valid, or does he bring it because he has sud-
denly discovered a manner in which to end a no longer desirable
marital relation without having to show cause or shoulder the
burden of alimony? In all probability the latter will be the rea-
son. The only plausible argument showing injury to the plaintiff
would be that at some future time someone else might upset the
marriage by attacking the original decree and that he would then
be stigmatized for having knowingly lived with a woman not
validly married to him. But it is unlikely that such an action
would ever be brought. The divorcee who procured the divorce is
estopped by virtue of his or her action, and if the other original
spouse either appeared or remarried he too will be barred.3 It is
possible that some other third party might collaterally attack the
foreign decree. This possibility will be discussed in detail in the
latter part of this article. However, it might be pointed out here
that the usual third party collateral attack is brought only after
the second marriage has been terminated by the death of one of
the parties. Moreover, in the unusual case of an attack during
the existence of the second marriage, success in such a suit
would not end the marriage for all purposes. It would be res
28. Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1950) ; Margulies v. Margulies,
109 N.J.E. 391, 157 Atl. 676 (Ch. 1931). See also Mumma v. Mumma, 86
Cal. App.2d 133, 194 P.2d 24 (1948) (action for damages for fraud after
invalidity of decree had already been established).
29. Woodward, dealing with collateral attacks generally, states that one
may impeach a foreign decree only when it affects an interest of his acquired
prior to its rendition. Woodward, Collateral Attack Upon Judgments On
the Ground of Fraud 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 103, 126 (1916).
30. 1 BrALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAw 479 if. See note 6 supra.
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judicata only as to those involved in the collateral action; any
additional effect of the decision in that case would have to arise
from the doctrine of stare decisis. Thus on the basis of lack of
sufficient injury, the attack of any second spouse should be
barred. There is no decided case doing so on that ground alone,
however.
The Second Spouse in the Role of a Defendant
The great majority of cases in which the second spouse has
questioned the validity of the foreign divorce have been actions
for annulment on his part, and thus since he is before the court
in the role of plaintiff, the equity maxim as to parties in pari
delicto has been especially apropos. But what of the more infre-
quent case in which the foreign decree is attacked defensively?31
Where the divorcee brings an action for support or alimony, the
second spouse is not seeking affirmative relief, but launches his
attack from a defensive position. The New York courts appar-
ently have taken the position that an estoppel should not then be
applied. 32 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has likewise differ-
entiated between the non-divorcee as a defendant and as a plain-
tiff. Tonti v. Chadwick33 illustrates this differentiation very
strikingly. The second husband of a divorcee brought an action
for annulment, alleging that his wife's previous divorce was
invalid. She cross-claimed for support. The court found the doc-
trine of pari delicto applicable and refused to annul the mar-
riage. But at the same time it declined to give the affirmative
relief of a support order to the wife, for in that aspect of the case
the second spouse had assumed the role of a defendant. Other
courts have not drawn a distinction between the offensive or de-
fensive position of the second spouse, when considering whether
an estoppel should be applied.3 4
May it not well be asked whether the New Jersey court did
31. It has been suggested that whether a party appears in an offensive
or defensive position frequently depends upon whose attorney won the race
to file the necessary papers. Lenhoff, Attack of Vulnerable Foreign Di-
vorces: Outposts of Resistance, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q., 457 and 959 (1946).
32. Elmi v. Elmi, 192 Misc. 926, 81 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Swan-
stonLv. Swanston, 76 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Maloney v. Maloney, 262
App. Div. 936, 29 N.Y.S.2d 419 (4th Dept. 1941). But see Oldham v. Old-
ham, 174 Misc. 22, 19 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
33. 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949).
34. Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1950) (applying estoppel);
Kiesenbeck v. Kiesenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P.2d 58 (1933) (denying estoppel).
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not indirectly give the second husband affirmative relief? He
is free to disregard the various marital duties with impunity so
far as his wife is concerned. Thus in many respects his marriage
was brought to an end, and he was in large degree allowed to
achieve indirectly what he could not do directly.3 5 The basic
reason for the application of an estoppel is that, in view of all
the circumstances present in a given case, the court concludes
that one who has "unclean hands" should not be permitted to
escape from the marital relation. The principal effect of an
escape from the marriage relation is the avoidance of the ob-
ligations incident thereto. Hence, the result of a non-application
of an estoppel is substantially the same whether the suit be one
for annulment by the second spouse or one for support by the
divorcee. Therefore, if a court really believes the interests of
society are better served by not upsetting the foreign divorce
it should not differentiate between the plaintiff attacker and the
defendant attacker. Certainly to have people dwelling in the
community who have been adjudged joined in the bonds of holy
matrimony and yet are incapable of enforcing the obligations
arising out of their marriage would appear against the better
interests of society. Such decisions as that in Tonti v. Chadwick
produce situations in which people are in effect "half-married
and half-unmarried." The letter of the law should not be per-
mitted to obscure its purpose.
ATTACK BY OTHER THIRD PARTIES
Collateral attack by other third parties will involve somewhat
different considerations from those which obtain in the case
where a second spouse is the assailant. In the case of attack by
the former, the basis of the litigation is almost invariably the ad-
vancement or protection of a property right. A typical case of
attack by a non-spouse third party is the situation in which an
heir or devisee of the deceased spouse seeks to bar the surviving
husband or wife from sharing in the estate of the decedent on
the ground that no valid marriage existed between them. A
35. "The majority opinion denies his right to annul the marriage on the
clean hands doctrine. As a result, the appellant, although estopped from
annulling the marriage is nevertheless permitted to escape the obligation of
support and maintenance. It is a peculiar and strange kind of equity which
by its decree prohibits an attack upon the contract itself but abnegates the
pecuniary obligation which flows from it." Justice Wachenfeld, dissenting
in Tonti v. Chadwick, I N.J. 581, 538, 64 A.2d 436, 440 (1949).
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second distinguishing feature is the fact that in the type of
cases now under consideration, the would-be impeacher himself
is very seldom chargeable with having aided or abetted the pro-
curement of the divorce.
The general rule with regard to third party collateral attack
is that such persons are free to impeach the validity of the de-
cree. Sometimes the court will make some such statement as the
following by way of introduction, and then immediately proceed
to review the evidence indicating whether there was sufficient
jurisdiction possessed by the divorcing court:
When a judgment recovered in one state is pleaded or pre-
sented in the courts of another state, either as a cause of
action, or a defense, or as evidence, the party sought to be
bound or affected by it may always impeach its validity, and
escape its effect, by showing that the court that rendered
it had no jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter
of the suit.36
However, one exception to the stated general rule is clear.
When a person sues in his capacity as executor or administrator,
his standing as such does not render him a third party in the
legal sense, and he will be deemed to occupy the precise legal sta-
tus which his decedent occupied. If the latter was barred, so also
is his representative. 37 Thus the personal representative of one
who procured a divorce prior to his remarriage cannot question
the second wife's claim in the estate of the deceased, on the
ground that the deceased's prior divorce was invalid.38 Nor can
the personal representative of the defendant in a divorce suit
who took advantage of the decree by remarrying seek to bar the
second spouse's claim in the defendant's estate.3 9 On the other
hand if the decedent was in a position to attack, his personal
representative in resisting claims upon the estate has not been
estopped. 40
36. In re Keen's Estate, 77 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
37. "There is such a privity between a decedent and the personal repre-
sentative of his estate that an estoppel arising by reason of the decedent's
conduct may be asserted against his representative." In re Brandt's Estate,
67 Ariz. 42, 45, 190 P.2d 497, 499 (1948).
38. Hynes v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 273 N.Y. 611, 7 N.E.2d 719
(1937).
39. Loftis v. Dearing, 184 Tenn. 474, 201 S.W.2d 655 (1947).
40. Azar v. Thomas, 206 Ga. 588, 57 S.E.2d 821 (1950); Green v.
Whately, 158 So. 628, 123 S.E. 871 (1924).
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Attack by an Heir or Devisee on His Decedent's Divorce
The advancement or protection of property rights which most
frequently gives rise to an attack upon the validity of a foreign
divorce is that by which the heirs or devisees of the decedent
seek to bar the surviving spouse of the deceased from sharing
in his estate. The basis for such action is that the marriage
between the deceased and his surviving spouse was invalid.
This marriage will always have been the second for at least
one of the spouses. The invalidity of this second marriage may
be assigned to one of two causes-that either a prior divorce
of the deceased was invalid or that a prior divorce of the sur-
vivor was invalid. When the divorce brought into question is
that of the decedent, he would have been estopped to question
the decree. If he procured it, he would be estopped to deny the
jurisdiction which he himself had invoked, and even though
he was the defendant in the divorce action, he would neverthe-
less be barred by his remarriage on the strength of the decree.41
On the other hand, where the divorce under attack is that of
the surviving spouse, we have seen that there is a division of
authority as to whether the decedent would have been estopped
had he possessed "unclean hands." It has also been indicated
that in the rarer situation involving no aid and no knowledge
there probably would have been no estoppel raised against him.
Contrary to what one might expect, the courts have not differ-
entiated to any extent between that situation in which the heir
or devisee of the decedent attacks the divorce of the decedent
and that type case in which the heir questions a divorce of the
decedent's spouse. We shall consider first the former situation.
The argument has frequently been advanced that, since the
decedent would have been estopped to question his own divorce,
his heirs2 claiming through him should be found in privity and
the estoppel thus applied to them also. This argument has, on
the whole, been rejected by the courts. The New York Court
of Appeals has plainly taken the position that, though the de-
cedent be estopped, the effect does not carry over to his heirs.
41. See note 30 supra.
42. In this note devisees of the deceased will be considered and discussed
as his heirs, since the courts have not differentiated between the two in their
opinions. This action of the courts is explained by the fact that in all the
cases arising the devisee would have in the absence of a will shared in the
estate as an heir.
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In the leading New York case, In Re Lindgren's Estate,43 the
decedent had obtained a Florida divorce from his first wife. His
first wife, bringing the action as guardian of a child by that
first marriage, sought to bar the husband's second wife from
administering and sharing in the estate. She was allowed to
show that her divorce from her husband was invalid for want
of jurisdiction in the Florida court. The Court of Appeals, after
pointing out that both decedent and his first wife acting on her
own behalf were estopped to question the jurisdiction of the
Florida court, said:
.. the law does not visit upon the child the disability thus
imposed upon the parent. The rights which are asserted in
this proceedings are not property rights to which either
parent has claimed to be entitled .... We are dealing with
matters personal to the claimant, not to the decedent or his
estate. As to the child they are independent rights to which
she claims to be legally entitled as the sole distributee of
her father's estate. Of course, the child was not a party
to the Florida divorce action and accordingly the judgment
then entered was not conclusive upon her or upon the rights
now asserted in her behalf."4
The position of the New York Court was reaffirmed very recently
in In Re Johnson's Estate.45 In this latter case, the court con-
cerned itself largely with the constitutional aspect of the case,
showing that the full faith and credit clause did not bar such
third party collateral attack, even when both spouses had ap-
peared in the foreign divorce suit. The policy of the state itself
to permit the attack went unquestioned. 4
Thd other cases in which the heirs sought to question the
validity of their decedent's divorce in order to bar a subsequent
spouse or children of the second marriage have practically all
43. 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E.2d 849 (1944).
44. Id. at 22, 55 N.E.2d at 850.
45. 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
46. The situation in which the children of the first marriage of the
decedent attack the legitimacy of those of his second marriage is analogous
and governed by the same principles set forth in the foregoing cases. See
In re Thomann's Estate, 144 Misc. 497, 258 N.Y. Supp. 838 (1932). Afortiori, the children of the first marriage will be allowed to attack the
legitimacy of those of the second when the "legitimate children" or "lawful
issue" of the deceased divorcee take by purchase in a will of someone other
than the deceased himself. In re Knowlton's Will, 192 Misc. 1032, 81 N.Y.S.2d
752 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Harry v. Dodge, 66 Misc. 302, 123 N.Y. Supp. 37(Sup. Ct. 1910); Ohnstead v. Olmstead, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 N.E. 569 (1908).
Accord: In re Thorn's Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 46 A.2d 258 (1946).
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concurred with the New York policy.47 The tenor of the opinions
indicates that the courts regard the heirship of the attackers
as a vested right existing independently of the rights of the
deceased. They consider it a right to be held sacrosanct and
inviolate. It is to be noted that there is little talk of the best
interests of society or of the vindication of the public policy of
the state, both of which are considerations characterizing the
opinions in the second spouse cases. Rather the courts seem
to dwell here more upon the protection of the somehow vested
property rights of the individual heir. On the whole, however,
it may be stated that outside of New York there are insufficient
cases involving an attack upon the deceased's divorce to provide
a pattern, although the tendency is certainly in favor of per-
mitting an attack.
Attack Upon the Divorce of the Surviving Spouse
Where the attack by the heirs of the decedent goes against
the divorce decree of the spouse whom he married, the courts
have likewise been prone to permit collateral attack. In only a
few of the cases permitting attack upon the claimant spouse's
divorce is it brought out clearly that the decedent had "unclean
hands" with regard to the invalid divorce.4 8 Whether under such
circumstances he would have been permitted to question his
spouse's divorce himself would depend upon the resolution of
the problems set out in the first part of this note.4 9 It is worthy
of attention that some of the courts which permit attack upon
the decree, despite the fact that the deceased was an aider or
abettor of the divorce, do so with some reservations; these courts
have pointed out that they limit their decisions to the particular
47. In re Paul's Estate, 77 Cal. App.2d 403, 175 P.2d 284 (1946); Adams
v. Adams, 154 Mass. 290, 28 N.E. 260 (1891) ; In re Grossman's Estate, 263
Pa. 139, 106 AtI. 86 (1919). Cf. In re Estate of Hancock, 156 Cal. 804, 106
Pac. 59 (1909). The value of this case may be seriously questioned, for the
court said, "As that questions [estoppel of the heirs] has not been dis-
cussed . . . we deem it proper to declare that this opinion shall not be taken
as establishing the law of the case thereon." Id. at 808, 106 Pac. at 62.(Nevertheless the case has been cited affirmatively thereafter). Contra:
Watson v. Watson, 172 S.C. 362, 174 S.E. 33 (1934).
48. Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A.2d 54 (Del. 1944); In re Ferry's Estate,
155 Misc. 198, 279 N.Y. Supp. 919 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; Ex parte Nimmer, 212
S.C. 311, 47 S.E.2d 716 (1948); In re Keen's Estate, 77 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934).
49. Whether the deceased would have been estopped in this type case
would appear to be immaterial to those courts which decline to estop the
heirs when the attack is upon the deceased's divorce.
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facts before them, and thus leave the way open for future
changes of heart. For example, the South Carolina court in
Ex Parte Nimmer said:
In conclusion, we wish to emphasize that our decision is
confined to the precise facts before us .... There are no
children of the marriage upon whom the imputation of il-
legitimacy may be cast. We leave untouched the question
of an estoppel under circumstances other than those now
presented. 0
Thus the ratio decedendi of these cases centers on the facts pecu-
liar to them. No other facts appearing, the interest of the heir
will be protected. But by dicta, the courts indicate that should
other facts appear (such as the birth of a child to the second
union), facts which would indicate to the judges a case of hard-
ship upon innocent parties, then they might well deem the public
interest better served by the imposition of an estoppel.
Several cases have held that where the deceased had "unclean
hands" with regard to the divorce of his spouse-later-to-be, his
heirs are to be denied the privilege of questioning the divorcee's
claim in his estate.5' In a case decided by the California District
Court of Appeals,52 it was held that since the decedent was active
in the procurement of the claimant's divorce, he would have been
estopped and that his heirs "being in privity" with their ancestor
are to be estopped also. No unusually compelling reasons for the
application of an estoppel appeared, and the court offered little
explanation for the result, aside from the fact that "heirs are
in privity with the ancestor." What the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia might have done with the case is moot5 3 In Kelsey v.
Miller 4 that court had a similar problem before it, and although
a review of the evidence revealed the validity of the second mar-
riage, the court did use language indicating it might have re-
50. 212 S.C. 311, 325, 47 S.E.2d 716, 722 (1948). Similarly the Delaware
court said, after pointing out that both parties to the marriage were dead
and there were no children to be illegitimized said, "Our decision is con-
fined to the precise facts before us.... Here we have no extraneous circum-
stances to-induce- a search for reasons for applying the principle of estoppel,
or any kindred principle of preclusion based on connivance or acquiescence."
Ainscow v. Alexander, 39 A.2d 54, 61 (1944).
51. In re Davis' Estate, 38 Cal. App.2d 579, 101 P.2d 761 (1940); Waldo
v. Waldo, 52 Mich. 94, 17 N.W. 710 (1883); In re Anderson's Estate, 121
Mont. 515, 194 P.2d 621 (1948). Cf. Kelsey v. Miller, 203 Cal. 61, 263 Pac.
200 (1928).
52. In re Davis' Estate, 38 Cal. App.2d 579, 101 P.2d 761 (1940).
53. See In re Estate of Hancock and comment thereon, note 47 supra.
54. 203 Cal. 61, 263 Pac. 200 (1928).
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sorted to an estoppel if necessary.55 Thus the decision might
well embody the policy of the California courts, especially in
view of the consistency with which California has applied an
estoppel in other situations.56
These decisions in which the estoppel of the deceased is car-
ried over to his heirs are few however. Even where it is mani-
fest that the deceased had "unclean hands," more often than not
the court goes no further than discussing the possibility of an
estoppel. Of course any state which has definitely adopted a
policy of permitting the heirs to attack the decedent's divorce,
in order to be consistent should allow an attack upon his hus-
band's or wife's divorce, despite the fact that he aided in obtain-
ing the decree.
The next situation to be considered is that in which the dece-
dent was not in par! delicto with the divorcee. No case barring
the heirs has been found where, for aught that appeared, the
deceased second spouse was innocent as regards the foreign di-
vorce.57 In New York that result is of course to be expected.58
55. "From a consideration of the marriage status of the persons that
may be seriously affected by this proceeding, the policy of the law would
require the sustaining of the judgment of the trial court if it can reasonably
be done. It is not necessary for us to rely on such an exigency in this case,
as the evidence and the law impels an affirmation of the judgment." Id. at
91, 263 Pac. 212. But see: In re Pusey's Estate, 177 Cal. 367, 170 Pac. 846(1918).
56. Brugiere v. Brugiere, 172 Cal. 199, 155 Pac. 988 (1916); Harlan v.
Harlan, 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945). The Montana Supreme
Court also has held that where the decedent aided in the procurement of
the surviving wife's divorce his heirs are estopped to challenge it. The
court said it mattered little what name was assigned to the doctrine by
which the decedent and his heirs were barred-call it quasi-estoppel, ratifi-
cation, inconsistency of conduct or the like. Although the court spoke in
terms signifying a policy of recognizing foreign divorces whenever possible
the case may not indicate so very liberal a policy. For the grounds upon
which the Nevada decree was procured were also available in Montana, and
thus there was no real clash between the public policies of the two states.
In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515, 194 P.2d 621 (1948).
57. More frequently than not any guilt or lack of guilt of the decedent
is not even discussed in the cases. At first blush, we might assume that in
such cases, owing to the failure of the court to mention it, there was a lack
of participation or knowledge on the part of the decedent. However, knowl-
edge of the circumstances under which the divorce was obtained had to
devolve upon the heirs somehow in order for them to be in a position to
attack it, and the most likely source of their information was the decedent
himself. Therefore, it might well be assumed that in some of the cases
there was at least knowledge on the part of the decedent, but that the judge
simply neglected to mention it because he considered it relatively unimpor-
tant. However, in the absence of a statement to the contrary, we must treat
these cases as situations in which there was no participation by the second
spouse.
58. The precedents extend well back into the nineteenth century. Brad-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1951/iss1/9
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The decided cases outside of New York concur in this result.0
However, it should be pointed out that the value of each of these
decisions (outside of New York) may be distinctly limited. The
view that any third party may always impeach a foreign decree
for lack of jurisdiction when it adversely affects him is stated
as a preface to these cases. This assertion is followed by a state-
ment that the burden of proof lies very heavily on the assailant
of the decree.60 But then in each of these cases, upon an exami-
nation of the facts, it is found that the foreign court did have
jurisdiction. Thus, though the heirs were permitted to attack,
the attack failed. Hence these cases cannot be said to support
very strongly the proposition that an attack will be permitted,
for an estoppel was not necessary to the protection of the decree.
The courts in these cases were never forced into a position where
they had to say definitely whether they would permit attack by
the heirs in a case involving a patent defect in the jurisdiction.
Perhaps, in the circumstances of these cases, an estoppel or the
like was not even pleaded before them.
Thus, outside of New York, the precedents for any attack by
heirs on the divorce of either the decedent or of his spouse would
not appear to be absolutely binding. In a case where definite
hardship would be inflicted upon innocent parties by a non-
recognition of the decree, a lawyer could argue plausibly and
with some hope of success for a bar upon the attack. Where
an heir or devisee questions a foreign decree, the courts ap-
proach the problem with an apparently preconceived idea that
he is free to make the attack. Certainly a cursory review of the
precedents would give the courts that idea. Thus the task of
shaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 487 (1835); Baker's Will, 2 Redf. Surr. (1876);
In re Kimball's Estate, 155 N.Y. 62, 49 N.E. 331 (1898); In re Higgins, 65
Misc. 415, 121 N.Y. Supp. 907 (Sur. Ct. 1909); In re Petersen's Estate, 192
Misc. 243, 78 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sur. Ct. 1948). In Bell v. Little, 204 App. Div.
235, 197 N.Y. Supp. 674 (4th Dept. 1922) the decedent clearly entered the
marriage cognizant of the circumstances of the divorce, but clearly had
not aided therein. The Appellate Division, with two judges dissenting, per-
mitted an attack by his heirs.
59. In re Pusey's Estate, 177 Cal. 367, 170 Pac. 846 (1918); Hobson v.
Dempsey Co., 232 Ia. 1226, 7 N.W.2d 896 (1943); McHenry v. Bracken, 93
Minn. 510, 101 N.W. 960 (1908); In re Sayle's Estate, 80 N.E.2d 229 (Ohio
App. 1948).
60. For example, "Courts very properly manifest great reluctance in
setting aside decrees of divorce after a second marriage has taken place,
and will not do so save upon the most satisfactory showing," Hobson v.
Dempsey Const. Co., 232 Ia. 1226, 1229, 7 N.W.2d 896, 898 (1943) (involv-
ing a dispute as to who was entitled to deceased's compensation insurance).
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persuading the courts to adopt a new position falls upon him
who contends for the preclusion of the attack but, given a proper
case of hardship upon innocent parties, it might not be an im-
possible task. In a situation where the benefits to be derived
from an upsetting of the decree would be slight when compared
with the magnitude of the harm to be inflicted upon others, many
courts might well say that the attack is not to be permitted.
Attack by Third Parties Other Than Heirs or Devisees
In mostly all of the foregoing attack-by-heir cases, the inva-
sion by the decree of a sufficient interest of the heir to enable
him to bring the divorce into question has been assumed.61 In
each of these cases the heir claimed property rights in an estate
which was ready for distribution, and thus the rights were
clearly ripe for enjoyment. A few cases, however, have involved
attacks by children during the lifetime of their parents, and
thus the children are not suing as heirs or devisees. In such
cases the question of what interest of the child has been invaded
becomes an important one. Ostensibly the purpose of the suit
may be to insure the support of the child or to establish his
legitimacy, where he was conceived prior to, but born after, the
divorce.6 2 Such attacks have not met with success, as the courts
have pointed out that there is some other method by which the
relief desired may be obtained, and that no vital interest of the
child has been put in jeopardy.63 The courts have probably real-
61. See, however, the suggestion In re Driscoll's Will, 194 Misc. 711, 714,
86 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (Sur. Ct. 1949). There the guardian of a child by the
first marriage of his father sought to bar the children of his father's second
marriage from a trust fund set up by his grandfather. The ground assigned
was that the father's Florida divorce ending the first marriage was invalid,
and that thus the children of the second marriage were illegitimate. "In
effect the guardian seeks to set aside the decree for fraud. Such a result,
however, may only be achieved by one whose rights have been directly
invaded. The child's legitimacy being unquestioned, the divorce did not
invade his rights on that score .... While the remarriage of his father and
the birth of five additional children to him reduced the child's share in the
trust fund herein from the whole to a one-sixth interest, that same result
might have followed had his parents never severed their marital relation-
ship, and the birth of other children of the union, or had his mother died
andis father remarried with issue born of the second marriage."
62. Farah v. Farah, 196 Misc. 460, 92 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; King
v. King, 189 Misc. 288, 74 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
63. An exception is the highly unusual case of Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272
App. Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dept. 1947). There, after the child's
parents had secured a void decree they continued to have intercourse, de-
spite of the fact that his father had remarried. Several years after the di-
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ized that the true purpose of such suits was undoubtedly the
setting aside of the decree for the benefit of one of the divorcees
who was himself barred from questioning it.
A few scattered cases have involved attacks upon foreign de-
crees by grantees of real property, who found it necessary to
impeach the decree in furtherance of their property rights. A
long standing California case held that where the grantor of the
attacker would have been estopped because he procured the
fraudulent decree, his grantee was in no better position. The
grantee was not permitted to bring the decree into question even
though such action was necessary to the establishment of his
title.64 In Samrmons v. Pike,65 the Minnesota court permitted the
grantee of one who had been a defendant in a foreign divorce
proceeding to attack the decree. In the divorce action, the
grantor had been a defendant who did not appear. This situa-
tion would indicate that the defendant-grantor himself would
have been able to question the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
However, the opponent of the grantee in the ejectment suit
urged that since the grantor, although aware of the divorce,
spent some seven years without attacking, she would have been
barred by laches and her grantee could be in no better position.
The court seemed to assume that the grantee stood in the shoes
of his grantor, but did not accept the contention of the grantee's
opponent that the grantor would have been barred. It is signifi-
cant to note that the court took pains to point out that it was
limiting its decision to the particular facts before it. It said
there would be no laches allowed since there were no interests
of innocent parties to be adversely affected by a finding that
the decree was void. It intimated that if there were children
who would be illegitimized or other hardships of that nature
worked, the court might then subordinate the property right of
the plaintiff to the interest of innocent parties. In other cases
the attacker's grantor probably would not have been estopped.
There the sole question was whether a grantee of real property
should be allowed to relitigate the question of jurisdiction, and
vorce, the plaintiff was conceived as a result of this supposedly extra-marital
intercourse. He was permitted to show the foreign decree was void in an
action for a declaratory judgment that he was legitimate.
64. Elliot v. Wohlfrom, 55 Cal. 384 (1880).
65. 108 Minn. 291, 120 N.W. 540 (1909).
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the grantee was allowed to do so. 6 Thus the few grantee cases
on record hold as one might expect. There is such a privity
between grantor and grantee, that an estoppel of the former will
bind his grantee. If the grantor were free to attack, there is
no basis on which to estop his grantee, and his property right
does provide a sufficient interest to justify the attack.
We have seen that the almost universal basis upon which an
attack is barred is some faulty conduct on the part of the at-
tacker or someone through whom he claims.6 7 That this is the
most consistent rationale of the cases is borne out by the deci-
sions in those situations where the attack is made by someone
to whom no faulty conduct can be ascribed, and who clearly can
not conceivably be found in privity with any guilty person. Such
cases have unanimously allowed a collateral attack. For example,
in one instance the plaintiff, a vendor, sued a husband in quasi-
contract for essentials furnished his wife. The husband pleaded
as a defence a foreign divorce which he had previously procured
from his wife, but the plaintiff was allowed to show that the
decree was void.A8 Similarly, a federal court allowed a defen-
dant in a suit for workman's compensation by a supposed widow
to show that she was really not the widow of the deceased. This
fact was established by the defendant's proving the invalidity
of a divorce granted the plaintiff from a previous husband .6
The other cases in which the third party is one who could not
possibly be deemed in privity with anyone who would be estopped
are in accord.70 They import the idea that there is no basis upon
which the attack might be foreclosed, provided the third party
shows a sufficient harm to his interest so as to justify his attack
upon the decree.
66. Ross v. Beale, 215 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Blondin v.
Brooks, 83 Vt. 472, 76 Alt. 184 (1910).
67. It is possible that fault is not actually the basic reason in all such
cases but rather merely provides the occasion on which the judges mayjustiiably prevent the collateral impeachment of a divorce issue apparently
once settled. But at any rate, faulty conduct on the part of someone is the
most generally assigned reason.
68. Lorrick v. Walters, 39 Ohio App. 363, 177 N.E. 642 (1930).
69. Sherman v. Federal Security Agency, 166 F.2d 451 (3rd Cir. 1948).
Accord: MacArthur v. Industrial Accident Commission, 20 P.2d 70 (Cal.
App. 1933).
70. Meade v. Mueller, 139 N.J.E. 491, 52 A.2d 157 (Ch. 1947); Wick v.
Dawson, 48 W. Va. 469, 37 S.E. 639 (1900).
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Conclusion
This note has approached the problem of attack upon foreign
divorces from the standpoint of the status of the individual
questioning the decree. The problem has perhaps been over-
simplified here--after all, the preclusion or non-preclusion of
the attack upon a foreign decree is simply another way of carry-
ing out the state's policy with regard to the recognition of for-
eign divorces. Many other factors undoubtedly influence the
decision. Among them are: the similarity of the causes avail-
able in the divorcing state and the second state, just how close
the divorcees did come to meeting the jurisdictional require-
ments, the degree of hardship that will be inflicted on other
persons, etc. But the primary determinant and certainly the
first problem to be considered is the status of the party seeking
to bring the decree into question. The rationale of the cases is
largely that fault, whether it be on the part of the attacker or
imputed to him from another, will (if anything is to do so)
evoke an estoppel. This is the bare reasoning advanced by the
courts. Whether it provides the occasion rather than the reason
might well be considered.
Should not the real question be whether third parties, in any
case, have a standing to attack the decree? Have these parties
really been hurt by the divorce? Certainly no right existing at
the time of its rendition was adversely affected. It is only later
that the course of events reveals that it would be advantageous
to attack the decree. Might the decree not be taken as one of
the many events of life which later prove to have a disadvan-
tageous effect upon an individual, events which one can do noth-
ing about?71
It is submitted that a third party really should have no stand-
ing to attack a foreign divorce decree. Only incidentally has he
been affected by it, and he is affected by the happening of many
past events of which he cannot later complain. Why not treat
the marriage relation as a concern solely of the parties thereto,
and let the state enforce its own public policy by means of
bigamy prosecutions, support orders, and the like?
WARREN MAICHEL
71. See note 62 supra.
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